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Multidimensional Sales Incentives in CRM Settings: 
Customer Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
 





In many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about their customers are 
responsible for customer relationship management (CRM). Private information can help the firm by 
increasing sales efficiency, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to maximize own 
compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative outcomes due to 
private information —ex-ante customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post 
customer moral hazard after acquisition. This paper investigates potential positive and negative 
responses of a salesforce to managerial levers--multidimensional incentives for acquisition and 
retention performance and job transfers that affect the level of private information. 
 
Salespeople are responsible for managing customer relationships and compensated through 
multidimensional performance incentives for customer acquisition and maintenance at many firms. 
This paper investigates how a salesperson’s private information on customers affect their response 
to multiple dimensions of incentives. Using unique matched panel data that links individual 
salesperson performance metrics with customer level loans and repayments from a microfinance 
bank, we find that sales people indeed possess private information that is not available to the firm. 
Salespeople use the private information to engage in adverse selection of customers in response to 
acquisition incentives. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual purpose; they not only reduce 
loan defaults, but also moderate adverse selection in customer acquisition. Transfers that eliminate 
private information reduces the adverse selection effects of acquisition incentives, but increase loan 
defaults—customer moral hazard. Despite the potential negative adverse selection effects due to 
private information, the effort increasing effect of each of the three dimensions of sales management 
we investigate---acquisition incentive, maintenance incentive and transfers all have a net positive 





effect on firm value. Methodologically, the paper introduces an identification strategy to separate 
customer adverse selection and customer moral hazard (loan repayment), by leveraging the 
multidimensional incentives of an intermediary (salesperson) responsible for both customer selection 





1 Introduction  
Firms increasingly recognize the value of customer relationship management (CRM). CRM 
recognizes that although acquiring customers is important, maintaining customer relationships—
and ongoing revenue streams--is even more critical for profitability (Jain and Singh 2002, Li, Sun 
and Montgomery 2011, Shin and Sudhir 2010, Reinartz, Krafft and Hoyer 2004, Venkatesan and 
Kumar 2004). In many B2C markets, salaried marketers are responsible for the CRM functions of 
acquiring customers and maintaining customer revenues using a centralized customer database; the 
academic marketing literature on customer management has generally focused on such settings 
(Gupta and Lehmann 2005, Venkatesan and Kumar 2004). But in many B2B markets and even B2C 
markets such as financial services in which high customer-level profit margins support ongoing 
personal selling, incentive-driven salespeople develop and manage customer relationships.1  
When using incentive-driven salespeople for customer management in B2B markets, two issues 
arise that have received little attention in the B2C literature on CRM. First, the extant literature 
on sales incentives is typically based on unidimensional measures of performance, typically sales 
revenues (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014; Misra and Nair 2011). But such single 
dimensional compensation plans are inadequate for CRM as they do not decompose performance in 
terms of sales generated from newly acquired customers and profit generated through maintaining 
relationships with existing customers.  Hence incentives are tied to multidimensional—acquisition 
and maintenance—performance of the sales person. Second, salespeople can have private information 
on customers through their relationships with customers. Private information can increase a 
salesperson’s efficiency and thus help the firm, but it can also hurt the firm if salespeople use it to 
maximize own compensation at the expense of the firm. Specifically, we consider two negative effects 
due to private information that can negate the productivity enhancing effects of incentives: ex-ante 
customer adverse selection at the time of acquisition and ex-post customer moral hazard after 
acquisition. 
                                                  
1 Interestingly, the best-selling CRM software is salesforce.com, which started as sales automation software and primarily 





This paper investigates how salespeople responsible for customer management respond to 
multidimensional performance incentives relevant for CRM, in the presence of private information 
about customers. Specifically, we study the salespeople’s response to three levers that impact 
incentives and private information and commonly used to manage a salesforce responsible for CRM: 
(1) acquisition incentives (2) maintenance incentives and (3) job transfers that affect the level of 
private information.  
We outline the managerial tradeoffs involved in the use of these levers. While acquisition 
incentives enhance productivity by motivating salespeople to bring in more customers, in the 
presence of private information, it may motivate salespeople to selectively target easier-to-acquire, 
poorer-quality customers with lower lifetime value (adverse selection).2 Maintenance incentives can 
not only improve customer maintenance and reduce customer moral hazard ex-post, but also 
incentivizes forward looking sales people to ex-ante not acquire lower quality customers (mitigate 
adverse selection). This is because maintenance incentives give salespeople a stake in the future cash 
flows from customer; making them consider the potentially negative consequences for their own 
future incentives from acquiring lower quality customers. Periodic job relocation or rotation can 
reduce the potentially negative effect of private information by eliminating private information.3 
But relocation eliminates not only the negative adverse selection effects of private information but 
also the efficiency enhancing effects. Whether salesperson relocation is profitable for the company 
is therefore an empirical question.4 
                                                  
2 The issue of adverse selection in response to sales incentives has received much attention in the popular press in the 
context of the subprime mortgage crisis. Loan officers in banks were accused of approving mortgages to customers with 
less than stellar credit, by disguising their lack of credit worthiness in formal applications in order to receive loan 
acquisition bonuses (reference and/or quote) as they were not responsible for subsequent performance. The issue of adverse 
selection is also critical in other marketing settings where firms invest substantially in customer acquisition and hope to 
recover the benefits of their investments over the life of the relationship. If salesperson knowingly acquire customers who 
are likely to stop doing business relatively soon after being acquired and before the acquisition costs have been recouped, 
such acquisitions can destroy firm value, rather than adding to firm value. 
3 Transferring employees is a common practice in the banking and B2B finance sector. For example, France, Germany, 
Italy and the United States, for example, mandate rotation of audit partners across clients. Also see discussion in Fisman, 
Parvasini and Vig (2011) on mandated transfers in the Indian state banking sector. 
4 Firms typically do not have levers either contractually or through incentives to appropriate this asset from the 






Given the background of the tradeoffs involved, the papers addresses the following research 
questions: (1) is there evidence of private information among salespeople? (2) do acquisition 
incentives lead to adverse selection? (3) do maintenance incentives mitigate adverse selection? (4) 
do transfers mitigate customer adverse selection, but increase moral hazard? (5) do the 
acquisition/maintenance incentives and transfers overall have a net positive or negative effect on 
firm profitability?  
Answering these questions pose a number of challenges. First, one needs matched panel data 
on sales force incentives/performance and customer relationships over time. This is typically difficult 
to obtain, as such data tend to reside separately within different functions of a firm. Specifically, 
the sales incentive and performance data reside within human resource/sales functions within a firm, 
whereas detailed customer panel data reside within the marketing function. We were fortunate to 
work with a microfinance bank in Mexico that lends to small business customers and was willing to 
match the panel data on performance/compensation/transfer information about their loan officers 
(salespeople) with the loan acquisition and repayment behavior of their customers. 
Second, detecting evidence of private information is typically challenging due to its intrinsic 
unobservability. Our primary identification strategy leverages the idea that salesforce performance 
and incentives should not directly affect consumer repayment behavior but only indirectly through 
salespeople’s efforts. Specifically, correlation between compensation performance and borrower 
repayment behavior conditional on credit rating, loan characteristics and various unobserved demand 
shifters is driven by private information held by salespeople about customers. In other words, if 
there is no private information for salespeople beyond what the company knows, then there should 
be no systematic relationship between salespeople’s incentive state and repayment behavior because 
a salesperson compensation status is not observable to borrowers. 
Finally, beyond the unobservability of private information, it is generally not feasible to observe 
exogenous changes in private information. In our empirical setting, the microfinance bank randomly 
                                                  
effects. For instance, although firms encourage salespeople to input information about the status of their ongoing 
conversations with prospects and stage of conversion in CRM tools such as salesforce.com, salespeople are reluctant to 






transferred their salespeople—the loan officers. The bank chose a randomized transfer strategy when 
loan officers cannot predict the likelihood of their transfers so that loan officers may not indulge in 
relationship harvesting bad behavior as the likelihood of transfer increases, because they will not be 
as responsible for the consequences of the bad behavior. Thus in our setting transfers serve as an 
exogenous instrument for how changes in private information affect responses to incentives. 
Our key findings are as follows: Overall, we demonstrate that private information is a relevant 
issue — salespeople indeed possess private information about customers not available to the firm. 
In response to customer acquisition incentives, salespeople indeed “abuse” the private information 
to engage in adverse customer selection—acquiring customers that controlling for observables known 
to the firm have lower expected profits. Customer maintenance incentives serve a dual positive 
purpose for the firm; they not only reduce ex-post loan defaults (customer moral hazard), but also 
moderate ex-ante adverse selection in customer acquisition. Private information has both positive 
and negative effects. When firms eliminate private information through job location transfers, it 
reduces adverse selection in response to acquisition incentives, but also increases loan defaults 
(customer moral hazard). But overall, the net effect of transfers is positive. Importantly, without 
the pressure of maintenance incentives, the positive effect of customer acquisition incentives will be 
neutralized by the negative effect of adverse selection through reduced customer quality at the 
margin.   
The paper contributes to multiple literatures in marketing and economics. Substantively, the 
paper extends the literature on CRM and sales force compensation. First it extends the CRM 
literature (e.g., Venkatesan and Kumar 2004), which has abstracted away from the role of an 
incentivized sales force to obtain desired customer management outcomes—an issue that is 
particularly important in B2B settings. In particular, the paper highlights the challenge of private 
information among salespeople in incentivizing the salesforce as it can have both positive and 
negative effects.  
Second, it expands the empirical literature on sales force compensation to move beyond a 
unidimensional performance measure (e.g., Misra and Nair 2011; Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 





problem highlighted by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) so that the salesforce balance their efforts 
across multiple dimensions. The issue of course is critical in B2B CRM settings. In our particular 
application, this balance is not just in allocating effort on two contemporaneous performance 
dimensions, but in addressing the right balance between short-run and long-run performance. In so 
doing, it addresses the challenges associated with limited liability of agents (e.g., Sappington 1983, 
Oyer 2000, Simester and Zhang 2014). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) leading to a focus on short-
run performance by combining “short-run” acquisition incentives with “longer-run” maintenance 
incentives. Customer maintenance incentives are a way of providing an ongoing stake in the 
“customer asset” for the salesperson and a means of aligning incentives between salespeople and the 
firm through an effective “partial ownership” (Grossman and Hart 1983).    
Methodologically, this study contributes to a growing literature that empirically tests for the 
existence of private information and distinguishes the effects of customer adverse selection and moral 
hazard in insurance and credit markets. Identifying the existence of private information and 
quantifying its effect are challenging because of its intrinsic unobservability. Previous studies address 
this problem by obtaining access to additional information unused by a firm (Finkelstein and 
McGarry 2006, Finkelstein and Poterba 2004). Moreover, by only observing customer behaviors ex 
post, researchers cannot disentangle the source from adverse selection ex ante and moral hazard of 
them ex post.5  Past studies address the issue through a randomized controlled experiment with 
contract terms (Karlan and Zinman 2009) or by exploiting policy changes (Dobbie and Skiba 2013). 
We introduce a new identification strategy that exploits “supply-side” variation in the salespeople’s 
motivation to use private information at the point of customer acquisition and maintenance and a 
policy that explicitly changes the level of private information about customers to separate customer 
adverse selection and customer moral hazard. 
                                                  
5 A positive correlation test proposed in Chiappori and Salanie (2000) explores the evidence of asymmetric information 
but does not separate adverse selection and moral hazard. For example, even when an insurance company finds a positive 
correlation between the plan coverage and the number of claims, it cannot fully attribute this finding to adverse selection 
(i.e., high-risk consumers opt into generous plans) or moral hazard (i.e., those who enroll in generous plans tend to become 





The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces institutional details and the 
data. Section 3 explains our empirical strategy and results and discusses the key findings. Section 4 
assesses the robustness of the key results. We conclude and provide future research direction in 
Section 5. 
2 Institutional Details and Data  
We begin with a description of the institutional details of our empirical setting and describe 
the data used in our empirical analysis. 
2.1 Institutional Details 
Our empirical application is in the context of a Microfinance Institution (MFI) in Mexico 
that lends to low income, small business entrepreneurs through loan officers (salespeople) without 
collateral. The loans offered are typically small (median of $690), high interest rate (median rate is 
85%), short maturity (median length is 6 months) and high delinquency probability (average of 
about 25.4%), as is common for microcredit in emerging markets.6 
The loan officers have two main responsibilities: acquiring new loans and ensuring 
repayments on existing loans. The acquisition stage involves recruiting borrowers through referrals 
and database searches, accepting loan applications and recommending loan terms to the bank. Banks 
use public information about the borrower available to the bank and information in the loan 
application to generate a five point credit rating for each borrower. This is used to both approve 
the loan and set the interest rate. Given acquisition, officers ensure that loans are repaid on time 
(e.g., through phone calls and in-person visits).  During this process, loan officers can obtain private 
information about clients’ motives, financial capabilities/liabilities and build relational capital. Our 
interest lies in how loan officers use this private information to enhance their incomes—either 
                                                  






through increased efficiency in customer acquisition and maintenance that are also beneficial to the 
firm or through adverse customer selection, which hurts the firm.7 
The firm offers a salary and a bonus that is a multidimensional function of both acquisition 
and customer maintenance performance. Acquisition performance is benchmarked against one’s own 
past performance to create an index of performance (  for officer j at period t). The maintenance 
performance index is based on the number and value of loans collected relative to the loans 
outstanding ( ). The salespeople’s bonus is the product of the acquisition index, maintenance 
index and their base salary (i.e., ); thus, receiving zero points in any 
category would earn them no bonus at all. Note that the multiplicative feature of the incentive 
scheme leads officers to balance effort between acquisition and maintenance in any given time period. 
Further, the multi-dimensionality of the compensation plan introduces a dynamic trade-off for the 
salesperson: between the immediate benefits of acquiring lower quality customers to improve 
acquisition performance, and its future negative effect on maintenance performance. 
Finally, the bank periodically relocates loan officers from their current branch to another 
branch.8 A particularly interesting characteristic of the transfer policy at the MFI is that the 
transfers both in terms of timing and location are entirely random. The randomness in timing is 
intended to prevent loan officers from engaging in greater adverse selection, when their expectations 
of transfer are high. We check that the transfer policy is indeed random and exogenous with respect 
to officers’ characteristic, previous performances and geographical region, as conceived by the firm.  
Fortunately, for our econometric analysis, this means we can treat transfers as an exogenous shock 
to salesperson private information and do not need to account for endogeneity concerns. 
2.2 Data 
                                                  
7 Although our data allow us to study repayment behavior within a loan, we lack sufficiently long panel data to study 
customer maintenance and repayment behavior across loans. In this paper, we treat repayment within the loan as 
corresponding to maintenance. 
8 Such transfers are common in the banking sector to avoid potential abuse of the private information by loan officers to 





Our panel data include monthly salesforce performance and compensation data matched with 
the transactions on loans generated and maintained by the salesperson. We observe 461 loan officers 
working on 129,839 loans for 14 months from January 2009 to February 2010. The loan data include 
information on loan characteristics such as the borrower’s credit rating, loan terms (e.g., amount, 
interest, origination date and loan duration) and details of loan repayment (e.g., monthly payments, 
delinquency). The loans are also matched with the loan officer who generated the sale, and the loan 
officer currently maintaining the loan (which is typically the originating officer, except when there 
is a transfer). For each loan officer, we have monthly information on the points on the acquisition 
and maintenance benchmarks, based on which the bonus is computed.    
We report summary statistics of loan characteristics and bonus points in Table 1. The average 
loan size is 9,192 pesos (approximately 690 US$ in 2009), with an average loan term of 6 months. 
The average interest rate as is typical in many emerging market for loans without collateral is high 
at 87%.  The high interest rate reflects both a high overall delinquency rate of approximately 25.4% 
and the very high cost of acquiring and collecting loans.9 The average of monthly acquisition points 
(A) is 0.75 and maintenance points (M) is 0.85 across the salesforce and across time; and the average 
of the overall bonus multiplier (A*M) is 0.59 of the salary. 10  More details on the marginal 
distributions of loan characteristics and points are presented in the Appendix. 
Next, we report on the relationship between bank’s credit rating of borrowers and loan 
performance. The bank’s rating of borrowers is shared with the loan officers who sell the loan and 
the loan underwriters, who approve the terms of the loan. Figure 1 shows that the delinquency 
probability falls and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of a loan11 improves as the credit rating goes 
up indicating that the credit rating is a reliable predictor of borrower quality and the loan’s risk 
                                                  
9 Approximately 56% of the loans are not repaid on time at least once. 
10 We observe officers’ base salary only in the last period for 273 officers. They earn 4050 Mexican pesos (313 USD) as 
base salary on average, with a standard deviation of 1650 pesos. Base salaries are determined by seniority, not by 
performance.  
11 We compute IRR of each loan based on loan size and returned amount over time. Our data do not include exact cash 
inflow; thus, we make the following assumption on the returned amount: a borrower decides to make zero repayment in 
the delinquent period and make full repayment in other periods. A loan officer cannot collect any amount from the period 





and performance. Table 2 further explores the relationship between credit rating and loan 
characteristics. 71% of the loans are given to those with credit ratings of 5, 18% to those with credit 
ratings of 4. Only 11% of loans are given to those with credit ratings of 3 and below. The interest 
rates are roughly the same across credit ratings, though the standard deviations are high. i.e., the 
bank does not seem to increase the interest rate to compensate for its greater risk. Instead, duration 
of the loan is greater for those with lower credit ratings, this may be the bank’s attempt to make it 
feasible for borrowers with lower incomes to help pay back the loan. 
Figure 2 shows that 33.4% of officers went through a transfer, and 3.2% did so more than once 
during the observation window. We check that the transfer policy is indeed random and exogenous 
as conceived by the firm. Table 3 reports the results of a logistic regression with transfer as a 
dependent variable, and observable officer characteristics as explanatory variables. Transfer is not 
related to any of the officers’ characteristics, such as tenure, the number of months since their 
previous transfer, gender, or previous period performance, confirming the firm’s description of the 
implementation of the transfer policy.12  
[Insert Table 1, Figure 1, Table 2, Table 3] 
3 Empirical Analysis 
We begin with a discussion of our identification strategy and then outline the steps of our 
empirical analysis to answer the research questions we raise in the paper. 
3.1 Identification Strategy 
Given that a salesperson’s private information is inherently unobservable, it is challenging to 
demonstrate the presence of private information, and identify the effects of such private information 
on salespeople’s performance outcomes. As we allude to in the introduction, there are two key ideas 
in our identification strategy to detect salesperson private information, customer adverse selection 
                                                  
12 We also find that the transfer decision is not correlated with officers’ past performances up to 3 months before transfers, 
or other officer characteristics, such as education level, marital status, relationship type (Canales and Greenberg 2015) or 





and customer moral hazard. The first is that a salesperson’s motivation to use the private 
information, if available, to achieve acquisition and retention performance benchmarks varies over 
time as a function of observable to researchers “states” of the salesperson. If the loans offered by a 
salesperson during periods their motivation to engage in adverse selection is greatest perform worse 
(controlling for observables available to both salesperson and the firm), we treat that as evidence 
for both sales person private information and customer adverse selection. Similarly, if the probability 
of repayment (customer moral hazard) changes as a function of the pressure to achieve maintenance 
benchmarks (after controlling for observables), that is evidence of salesperson private information 
and customer moral hazard. The key identification assumption is that the sales person incentive 
states and motivations are orthogonal to customer and loan characteristics because customers do 
not observe officer incentive states.  
Second, the random transfer policy of the MFI provides us another exogenous “supply” variation 
in the level of private information among salespeople on their customers. By relocating loan officers 
to new branches and forcing them to acquire and maintain new customers, the MFI renders the 
salespeople’s private information from established customer relationships useless for performance. 
Comparing the continuing officers’ customer acquisition and retention performance outcomes against 
transferred officers’ performance outcomes helps us identify the effect of private information on 
customer adverse selection and moral hazard. Again, the key identification assumption is that the 
transfer policy creates a supply-side variation that is not correlated with demand-side factors, such 
as customer and loan characteristics.  
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we examine selection effects on the quality 
of loans originated due to acquisition incentives, retention incentives and job rotation. This allows 
us to test for both the existence of private information and how the three managerial levers impact 
adverse selection. Second, we examine ex-post consumer moral hazard after loan origination i.e., 
repayment/delinquency behavior in response to the three levers. Finally, we examine the overall 





3.2.1 Ex-Ante Selection Effects when Originating Loans 
We begin with a test for whether the performance of a loan is a function of the acquisition, 
maintenance and transfer states of the officer at the time of origination of the loan by estimating 
the following empirical model. 
             (1) 
In equation (1), we measure loan performance through , the internal rate of return of loan 
i, originated by officer j at time o. The variables representing incentive states are Acquisition index 
at o, , the Maintenance index at o-1, denoted by .13 The dummy variable  
equals 1 if officer j was new to the branch at origination period. The model also controls for 
observable loan characteristics in  , such as borrower’s credit rating, loan amount, duration, 
interest rate and the number of months since origination. Furthermore, the model includes loan 
officer fixed effects and time fixed effects to capture any unobserved heterogeneity of loan officers 
and market shocks such as competition against other banks or macroeconomic financial shock.14  
The coefficients we are primarily interested in are , and . The coefficients  and  
in equation (1) represent how IRR of each loan changes in response to sales force incentives at 
acquisition period o, conditional on observables and salesperson/period fixed effects. Controlling for 
observables, salespeople can use their private information to go after “easier to acquire” loans with 
lower IRR.  Negative  implies that as the salesperson’s performance on the acquisition increases 
in the period, IRR of the loans fall, indicating adverse selection. Negative  implies that adverse 
                                                  
13 We construct demeaned variables  and  to eliminate any effect of cross-sectional unobservables. The 
demeaned variables measure how well or badly each officer performs, relative to her own average performance. The 
demeaned Acquisition points are computed as , where is the number of periods that officer j 
appears during the observation window. While acquisition points are considered for time period o, based on the acquisition 
at period o, which is controlled by the loan officer. For maintenance, we consider the index from o-1, which indicates the 
level of pressure for ensuring repayment in period o. However, the actual maintenance index in period 0 is not realized 
until after the end of the period, and is not entirely under the loan officer’s control. 
14 In this specification, we abstract away from potential concerns of endogeneity of loan terms X, but will revisit the 





selection is moderated by the maintenance incentive and that officers are forward-looking, i.e., 
officers under high maintenance pressure (i.e., those who showed poor maintenance performances at 
o-1) screen out unprofitable borrowers at o to prevent higher delinquency risk in the future (which 
would further worsen their maintenance metric) and therefore acquire higher IRR loans, controlling 
for observables. The coefficient  shows the effect of the transfer policy. A positive  shows that 
transferred officers acquire better loans than do continuing officers, suggesting that salespeople with 
little private information (relational capital) are likely to engage less in adverse selection.  
Table 4 reports the results. In Model 1, a one-point increase in acquisition performance relative 
to the loan officer’s average leads to 0.54% decrease in IRR of new loans. A one-point decrease in 
the previous period’s retention performance, which generates motivation to earn retention points, 
leads to a 1.07% increase in IRR of new loans. Transferred officers, whose private information is 
eliminated, bring in higher-quality loans at 2% of IRR. This shows evidence of private information 
among the salesforce, that higher acquisition performance accentuates adverse selection, and 
maintenance pressure mitigates adverse selection and transfers mitgate adverse selection.15 
Model 2 adds the interaction term between two incentive components, and Model 3 includes 
quadratic terms of demeaned incentives to capture potential nonlinearities. The results above remain 
robust; all of the specifications support the hypothesis that the marginal quality of the loan suffers 
due to the loan officers’ use of private information to accept risky borrowers. 
Coefficients of other variables exhibit the expected direction. As observable credit rating 
increases, IRR goes up. Smaller loan, longer duration and higher interest rate are associated with 
lower profitability.  
[Insert Table 4] 
3.2.2 Ex-post Customer Moral Hazard  
Next, we investigate how the acquisition/maintenance incentives and transfers impact 
customer moral hazard, i.e., repayment behavior or delinquency.  Given private information, loan 
                                                  
15 The results remain consistent when we measure loan performance through 1) the number of late repayments, 2) the 





officers can increase monitoring to reduce customer’s moral hazard on repayment especially when 
they are under high maintenance pressure. However, transferred officers without private information 
may perform worse on this dimension as they have less information on where to focus their 
monitoring effort. As there is a balance between time spent on acquisition and maintenance, higher 
customer acquisition may be related to greater delinquency. 
     (3) 
In equation (3), ijtDelinquency  is the dummy for delinquency of loan i at time t belonging 
to officer j. The model separately examines the effects on loans that are already delinquent at the 
end of t-1, which is represented by the indicator.16 We believe sales people will have greater impact 
on loans that are not already delinquent, and therefore sales incentives will have greater impact on 
such loans. The model also controls for loan characteristics and officer and period fixed effects.  
The main coefficients of interest are coefficients concerning maintenance points, which 
primarily incentivizes ensuring repayments on loans. A positive  shows that salespeople under 
high maintenance pressure (i.e., low ) increase monitoring intensity to improve borrowers’ 
repayment behavior at t. A positive  indicates the removal of private information due to transfer 
at t causes increases delinquencies; suggesting that private information and the relational capital 
with the borrowers does help in ensuring repayment and that they are able to target the efforts on 
the right borrowers. We expect  to be negative as loan officers are likely to be less effective on 
getting repayments of already bad loans relative to loans in good standing, even with maintenance 
incentives.  
The estimates are reported in Table 6. Model 1 has only retention incentives as the incentive 
pressure at t, Model 2 has both acquisition and retention incentives, Model 3 adds the interaction 
of the two components, and Models 4 and 5 do not differentiate between high-quality and low-
                                                  
16 We check the robustness of results with other definitions of the variable (e.g., delinquency for 2 or 3 consecutive periods, 






quality loans. The coefficient of  is positive and significant in Models 1, 2 and 3, indicating 
that retention pressure improves monitoring and reduces delay of good loans. Specifically, a one-
unit increase in retention points in period t-1 (which decreases retention pressure in period t), leads 
to a 2% increase in the delinquency probability of loans in period t among loans in good standing 
at t-1. Across Models 1-3, the coefficient of  is consistently positive and significant, 
indicating that that the elimination of private information about customers from salespeople through 
transfers hurts loan repayment by 0.4%. Interestingly acquisition effort and maintenance effort are 
not substitutes; the negative coefficient of  in Model 2 indicates that acquisition and retention 
performance are complementary. Officers expanding their acquisition effort for new loans also have 
better maintenance performance. This is of course due to multiplicative nature of the acquisition 
and repayments performance on incentives.  
A large effect of  suggests that loans that are already delinquent are more likely to 
remain so. Thus, under high retention pressure, officers are less likely to monitor such low-quality 
loans and more likely to focus on the loans in good standing. The negative coefficient of 
 suggests that low-quality loans receive less monitoring and ultimately become 
delinquent under high retention pressure. Transfer has little effect on bad loans, because continuing 
salespeople do not exert sufficient efforts to maintain the borrowers.  
[Insert Table 5] 
3.2.3 Total Profits of Loans Generated by Salesperson 
Next we test whether the net effect of the acquisition, maintenance and transfer levers is 
positive or negative across loans generated by a salesperson over the month. This allows us to test 
whether the sales-enhancing effect of the managerial levers of incentives demonstrated in the existing 
literature (e.g., Chung, Steenburgh and Sudhir 2014) and transfers exceeds the the negative adverse 
selection effect due to the private information on marginal loans. To investigate the question, our 





following model in equation (2), where we test whether the total NPV of the loans generated by 
salesperson j at period o is positively or negatively affected by the three levers. 
      (2)     
The dependent variable  represents the sum of the net present value of new loans 
acquired by officer j at period o. The coefficients  ,  and  show the effect of incentive 
components on the overall quality of loans originated by officer j. The coefficient  shows the 
effect of the transfer decision at the point of origination on profits generated by salesperson j. 
Table 5 reports the regression results. Model 1 is the baseline case and the estimates show
, , and  and the effects are statistically significant. This shows that each of the 
levers considered contribute positively to firm profits. However we need to consider the interaction 
between acquisition and maintenance states to understand how these incentives jointly affect 
profitability. Model 2 adds the interaction term between acquisition points and retention states, and 
Model 3 adds squared terms of the incentive states to capture potential nonlinearities.  
We represent the interaction effects estimated in Model 2 in Figure 3. When the salesperson is 
under high maintenance pressure (i.e., those whose previous-period maintenance points are 0.5 point 
below their average points), greater acquisition performance leads to a sharp increase in profits, but 
when the maintenance pressure is low (0.5 point above their average points), an increase in 
acquisition points lead to very little increase in profits. Thus in the absence of maintenance pressure, 
salespeople engage in significant adverse selection which effectively neutralizes all the profits from 
customer acquisition. In effect, the firm is paying out commissions with little gains in profitability. 
This shows that without the use of maintenance metrics of performance that penalizes for ex-post 
delinquency, salespeople will resort to significant adverse selection that destroys firm profitability. 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 2] 
3.3 Managerial Implications 
Our findings have large managerial implications concerning salesforce management. First, our 





based incentives can be complementary, as theoretically shown by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994). 
We find that delegating CRM functions to sales agents can be more profitable when they effectively 
utilize accumulated relational capital (i.e., private information). A carefully designed performance-
based incentive scheme prevents sales agents from taking advantage of the information to shirk, and 
the company can benefit from the relational capital. In other words, our results indicate that a 
performance-based incentive scheme can enhance the benefits of relational capital. 
Second, related to the first point, multi-dimensional incentive plans, which reward both 
customer acquisition and retention, are useful to utilize relational capital effectively when sales 
agents directly manage the customer relationship. The traditional unidimensional incentive plan, as 
studied in the existing papers, does not effectively motivate salespeople to value the long-term profit 
that each customer generates. In contrast, splitting acquisition bonus and retention bonus forces 
sales agents to consider not only short-term profits but also long-term profits. We demonstrate that 
sales (acquisition) incentive can increase performance but intensify customer adverse selection, and 
that retention incentive alleviates customer adverse selection because salespeople now consider the 
effect of their current acquisition behavior on future retention performance. Hence, our work sheds 
new light on the role of multi-dimensional compensation plans in CRM.  
Third, our findings also suggest what managers must consider when considering job rotation. 
We find that random job transfers can be used to avoid undesirable consequences of relational 
capital. Because relational capital is owned by salespeople and not transferrable across them, the 
firm completely shuts off unobserved or unreported information about a customer upon sales agent 
rotation. Transferred salespeople, with less private information than continuing ones, are less likely 
to participate in adverse selection and more likely to mismanage existing customers’ moral hazard. 
Transfers have a positive net effect on overall productivity in our setting, but the effects would be 
heterogeneous across industries depending upon how salespeople use their private information. 
Overall, our results provide useful guidance for managers in designing salesforce management 





4 Robustness Checks  
We complement our main results with robustness checks. First, we consider whether potential 
endogeneity issues in loan terms change our results concerning loan officer private information by 
an instrumental variable approach. Second, we perform a falsification test of our main hypothesis 
by considering continuing and transferred officers separately. Finally, we examine whether 
unobserved branch-level local unobserved heterogeneity drives our results. Other robustness checks 
we perform can be found in the Appendix.  
4.1 Endogeneity in Loan Terms 
In Section 3.2, one might be concerned with endogeneity issues of loan terms because they are 
determined by both sales agents and borrowers through negotiation. Salespeople, however, consider 
expected profitability of loans when deciding loan characteristics, which can lead to endogeneity in 
loan terms. In this robustness check, we assess by calculating the models with instruments for loan 
amount and duration.  
Our instrumental variable is the average loan characteristics of other loans acquired by the same 
loan officer j at period o.17 The variables affect loan characteristics of loan i, because loan size, for 
example, reflects loan officer j’s overall tendency to approve large or small loans. Loan size is also a 
function of negotiation between the officer and the borrower; thus, it provides a variation not fully 
captured by officer fixed effects or officer’s incentive points. However, the average characteristics of 
other loans should not directly affect the ex post profitability of loan i.  
We report the results in Table 7. With instrumenting, IRR is now negatively correlated with 
loan amount and positively with duration in Model 1. The reversed sign of coefficients verifies 
endogeneity in loan terms.18 We find that the effects of our main variables interest, Acquisition point 
                                                  
17 Our idea of instrumental variables is similar to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), in which the authors use the 
characteristics of other products as instruments to control for endogeneity of price.  
18 Controlling for the selection effect, the negative coefficient of loan amount implies that those who have greater loans 
are more likely to default, which is a moral hazard, whereas the remaining selection effect is positive, which implies 
advantageous selection. In contrast, the moral hazard effect of duration is limited. Those loans with longer duration are 






and Retention point become stronger once the endogeneity issue is addressed. Hence, despite loan 
terms being subject to endogeneity, our main results are robust.  
[Insert Table 7] 
4.2 Endogeneity in branches where the officers are transferred 
In Section 3, one of our key identification strategies relies on random salespeople transfers. 
Although our findings in Table 3 suggest that the firm’s transfer policy is random, officers in under-
performing branch are still likely to be transferred to high-performing branches or branches in good 
market condition. If so, transferred officers may face a more profitable customer base in a new 
branch; thus, her new loans might perform better, which has nothing to do with effects of private 
information. To address this concern, we include branch fixed effects and estimate coefficients in 
equations (1) and (2). 
Tables 8a and 8b show that our main results remain consistent with branch fixed effects. We 
add Model 1 without branch fixed effects from Tables 4 and 5 for comparison. At the acquisition 
stage described in Table 8a, loan officers still become involved in adverse selection as they expand 
their acquisition efforts, with a one-unit increase in acquisition state pushing up IRR by 0.4%. The 
retention pressure forces officers to look forward and hold out for risky loans. The incentive states 
have smaller effect in Model 2 than in Model 1, since branch-level market conditions (i.e., overall 
quality of customer base in a branch) is controlled.  The coefficient of  shows that 
transferred officers bring in higher quality loans than do continuing officers, even when we focus on 
within-branch effects. The transfer effect is slightly higher in Model 2, suggesting that the transferred 
officers bring in higher-quality customers, regardless of branch-level performances. The anticipated 
performance of a branch or market conditions do not drive transfer decisions. 
Table 8b documents salespeople’s monitoring behavior within a branch. While the main result 
remains consistent, the incentive points have smaller effects with branch fixed effects, for both good 
and bad loans. In Model 2, the effect of transfer represented by the coefficient of  is 






salespeople do not effectively monitor existing loans, particularly bad loans. Without branch fixed 
effects in Model 1, transferred officers are not effective in monitoring good loans. We conjecture that 
this change in findings is due to  (    ). The findings indicate that heterogeneity in the customer 
base across branches does not drive the main results. Salespeople use their private information 
regardless of the features of the population with which they interact.  
[Insert Tables 8a and 8b here] 
 
4.3  Effect of Ratcheting Incentive 
We describe that the bank’s compensation scheme creates a dynamic consideration for officers, 
particularly in Acquisition points (A). One may raise a concern that the incentive scheme is not free 
from ratcheting effect because a loan officer’s monthly acquisition goal depends upon previous 
periods’ acquisition performance.20 While salespeople put acquisition efforts to earn high Acquisition 
points, they might shirk off to the extent that they fear high sales would only result in an 
unachievable quota next period.  
Although we cannot simulate officers’ behaviors under a counterfactual incentive scheme 
without any ratcheting effect21 and observed behaviors of salespeople under ratcheting incentives 
may not maximize their current utility, we believe that the ratcheting effect rather reinforces our 
adverse selection claims. The ratcheting effect would reduce acquisition efforts; thus, salespeople 
should engage in less-severe adverse selection. Thus, we argue that our calculations are the lower 
bound of potential adverse selection of new customers. 
Our idea to examine the effect of the ratcheting effect considers that salespeople would not 
want to exceed the cutoff, above which their quota increases in a discrete manner, even though they 
                                                  
20 Loan portfolio size at the beginning of each period determines Acquisition Goal and is thus again a function of 
acquisition performance in past periods. 
21 We leave it for future research. The evidence would demonstrate the advantage of a ratcheting incentive in an 
organization in which adverse selection is largely detrimental. A ratcheting incentive is commonly considered to hurt a 
firm because it induces employees to reduce efforts. However, it also causes them to focus not only on sales but also to 
balance between quantity and quality aspects. Consequently, the firm would benefit from mitigated adverse selection and 





are able to do so. We separately analyze loans generated by such high-performing officers, whose 
average Acquisition performance would lead them to exceed the cutoff, and those originated by low-
performers. Although officers’ average performances, which categorize salespeople into high- and 
low-performers, are already affected by ratcheting incentives, this analysis would enable us to 
roughly  suggest that ratcheting incentives ameliorate the extent of adverse selection. In Table 9, 
Model 1 analyzes IRR of loans originated by high performers (i.e., loan officers who would have got 
higher Acquisition goal if they performed on average) and Model 2 looks into the profitability of 
loans sold by low performers. We find that high-performers who should be concerned about 
ratcheting incentives do not show adverse selection behaviors, while low-performers do. The 
coefficients of  imply that high-performing salespeople are more likely to avoid risky decisions 
under maintenance pressure. Overall, without ratcheting effect, our main result on adverse selection 
may have been higher. 
 
[Insert Table 9] 
5 Conclusion  
In this paper, we empirically study three key issues that arise when incentive-driven salespeople 
manage customer relationships using the rich micro-level data that include both salesperson 
compensation/performance data and their customer-level transaction data.  
First, when salespeople are delegated CRM, they can obtain private information about 
customers through interactions with customers beyond what the company can observe from hard 
information in the customer database. This private information can help salespeople find and 
maintain good customers, but at the same time the salespeople can also abuse the private 
information by bringing in bad customers to increase their short-term payoffs.  
Second, a unidimensional sales-based incentive scheme, which has been primarily examined in 
the salesforce compensation literature, might not work well when salespeople are in charge of CRM, 





can incentivize salespeople. Thus, we consider how private information about customers influences 
salespeople’s behavior under a multi-dimensional incentive scheme. 
Third, the company can exploit temporal job transfers or rotations as a tool to manage the 
potentially negative effects of private information that salespeople could abuse. Job transfers change 
salespeople’s private information and mitigate the negative effects. Different levels of transfer policies 
in different industries can reflect the degree of asymmetric information that salespeople can acquire.  
Our findings suggest that officers have private information about customers’ ability to repay 
and that they leverage their unobserved knowledge to earn higher incentives. They accept less-
deserving borrowers to obtain high acquisition points but become conservative under retention 
motives because they are afraid that low-quality loans might hurt their future retention points. At 
the repayment stage, officers become involved in more monitoring to reduce borrowers’ moral hazard 
if they have high retention pressure. Moreover, we find random relocation mitigates adverse customer 
selection because transferred officers do not have such private information.  
Our findings provide important managerial implications for CRM. When managers design a 
salesforce management scheme, they must consider potential complementarity between delegation 
of CRM to the salesforce and implementation of a high-powered incentive. Moreover, managers must 
design incentive schemes carefully so that agents’ incentives are aligned with the company to address 
not only short-term profits but also long-term profits to increase CLV. Finally, job rotation would 
also influence the effectiveness of an incentive scheme because it eliminates relational capital upon 
a transfer. Hence, frequency of job rotation should be carefully done together with the design of an 
incentive scheme and the degree of asymmetric information in the market.  
Methodologically, we employ a new strategy to identify adverse selection of customers. Our 
identification strategy for the effect of private information and adverse customer selection can be 
generalized to other situations to the extent that customers are not able to observe the supply-side 
incentives. 
This paper does not address how firms that become involved in CRM optimally design salesforce 
compensation schemes. Structural models of salesforce-driven CRM behavior with multi-dimensional 
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A Appendix 
A.1 Details on Compensation Plan 
In this section, we provide detailed structure of the compensation policy that the bank 
implements. Tables A.1 and A.2 exhibit the detailed compensation policy on how Acquisition Goal, 
and Retention points are determined. 
[Insert Table A.1] 
The Acquisition Point (A) is the amount of newly acquired loans divided by Acquisition Goal 
(Table A.1.), which is a function of the loan officer’s current total loan amount lent. A loan officer 
who has acquired many new loans will face a significant increase in his/her Acquisition Goal. Hence, 
to the extent that he wants to avoid an unachievable high growth point target, the loan officer might 
not want to increase efforts to acquire new customers. We examine this ratcheting effect in Section 
4.  
[Insert Table A.2] 
As in Table A.2, the retention incentive has non-linear structure. Observe that this non-linear 
structure does not create any ratcheting incentive for loan officers because current retention points 






Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Loan Characteristics Mean SD Min Max 
Amount (pesos) 9,192 8,956 700 55,000 
Annual Interest rate (%) 87.21 8.81 42 100.29 
Duration (months) 6.27 3.89    1 33 
Delinquency (%) 25.42    
Sales Force Incentives and Transfer Mean SD Min Max 
By Salesperson-
period 
Acquisition Point (A) 0.75 0.45 0 3.188 
Maintenance Point (M) 0.85 0.23 0 1.25 
By Salesperson 
A*M 0.59 0.3   
No. of Transfers 0.37 0.55 0 3 
 
 




IRR Delinquency prob Interest rate Duration 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1 4,484 45.9 44.57 0.65 0.36 88.67 9.83 10.76 6.38 
2 3,089 53.36 39.46 0.59 0.38 86.71 9.58 10.84 6.89 
3 6,754 66.98 35.63 0.46 0.38 88.1 8.46 8.43 4.41 
4 23,768 79.16 23.96 0.25 0.3 86.27 7.25 6.13 3.77 











Table 3: Randomness of Transfer Policy 















A at t-12 
-0.251  -0.294    -0.0195
(0.203)  (0.206)    (1.199)
M at t-12  0.342 0.429    -1.771
 (0.387) (0.406)    (2.916)
Tenure 
   -0.00199   0.00960
   (0.00139)   (0.00850)
Female     0.368  1.645
    (0.241)  (1.047)
Time since    
Last Transfer 
     0.151 0.357
     (0.0957) (0.282)
Intercept -2.897*** -3.505*** -3.218*** -2.716*** -3.440*** -4.284*** -6.338*
(0.304) (0.452) (0.439) (0.152) (0.182) (0.486) (3.493)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
N 2,603 2,646 2,590 3,224 1,947 696 150
1Logistic Regression (DV: Transfer, Indicator 1 if an officer is new to the branch at period t)  














Table 4. Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of Newly Originated Loans 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV IRR IRR IRR 
 
-0.537*** -0.540*** -0.645*** 
(0.152) (0.152) (0.159) 
 
-1.070** -1.059** -0.970* 
(0.538) (0.538) (0.567) 
 
 0.556  
 (1.382)  
   -0.556** 
  (0.244) 
 
  1.037 
  (1.851) 
 1.987*** 1.984*** 1.988*** 
(0.216) (0.216) (0.216) 
Rating 2 
3.991*** 3.991*** 3.995*** 
(0.598) (0.598) (0.598) 
Rating 3 
13.33*** 13.33*** 13.33*** 
(0.476) (0.476) (0.476) 
Rating 4 
21.74*** 21.74*** 21.75*** 
(0.420) (0.420) (0.420) 
Rating 5 
26.66*** 26.66*** 26.66*** 
(0.404) (0.404) (0.404) 
Loan Amount 
0.630*** 0.630*** 0.629*** 
(0.0790) (0.0790) (0.0790) 
Duration 
-0.108*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Interest Rate 
0.657*** 0.657*** 0.657*** 
(0.00703) (0.00703) (0.00703) 
Intercept 
-10.95*** -10.97*** -10.87*** 
(1.231) (1.232) (1.233) 
Salesperson, Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 89,993 89,993 89,993 







Table 5. Delinquency of Existing Loans   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV Delay Delay Delay 
 
0.0201*** 0.0203*** 0.0203*** 
(0.00763) (0.00764) (0.00778) 
 0.00448* 0.00442* 0.00442* 
(0.00257) (0.00257) (0.00257) 
 0.470*** 0.470*** 0.470*** 
(0.00198) (0.00198) (0.00198) 
 
-0.0954*** -0.0957*** -0.0957*** 
(0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0129) 
 -0.00403 -0.00376 -0.00377 
(0.00390) (0.00390) (0.00391) 
 
 -0.00440** -0.00441** 
 (0.00178) (0.00180) 
 
 0.000994 0.000999 





  -0.000603 
  (0.0300) 
Rating 2 
-0.00468 -0.00468 -0.00468 
(0.00415) (0.00415) (0.00415) 
Rating 3 
-0.0720*** -0.0720*** -0.0720*** 
(0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00351) 
Rating 4 
-0.165*** -0.165*** -0.165*** 
(0.00314) (0.00315) (0.00315) 
Rating 5 
-0.253*** -0.253*** -0.253*** 
(0.00301) (0.00301) (0.00301) 
Loan Amount 
-0.00482*** -0.00483*** -0.00483*** 
(0.000718) (0.000718) (0.000718) 
Duration 
0.00162*** 0.00163*** 0.00163*** 
(0.000180) (0.000180) (0.000180) 
Interest Rate 0.00212*** 0.00212*** 0.00212*** 
(0.0000686) (0.0000686) (0.0000686) 
Age of Loan 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 
(0.000299) (0.000299) (0.000299) 
Intercept 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
(0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Salesperson, Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 278,943 278,943 278,943 





Table 6:  Total NPV of Originated Loans by Salesperson by Month  






















Salesperson FE Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes 
N 3,403 3,403 







Table 7: IRR of Newly Originated Loans  
with Instrumental Variables  
 Model 1 













































Table 8a: IRR of New Loans with Branch FE 
 Model 1* Model 2 

































Salesperson FE Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes 
Branch FE No Yes 
N 89,993 86,886 






Table 8b: Delinquency of Existing Loans with Branch FE 













































Salesperson FE Yes Yes
Period FE Yes Yes
Branch FE No Yes
N 278,943 274,907
*Model 2 in Table 5 
***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1 
 
°
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Table 9. Effect of Ratcheting Incentives 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 High* Low* 



































Period FE Yes Yes 
N 3,414 86,579 
 
*High (performers): Those whose Acquisition goal would have increased, if they performed on average. 










Table A.1: Compensation Plan – Acquisition Goal25 
Initial Portfolio Size Jan 2009 – Jun 2009 Jul 2009 – Feb 2010 
0 – 500,000 50,000 60,000 
500,001 - 1,000,000 70,000 80,000 
1,000,001 – 1,500,000 90,000 100,000 
1,500,001 – 2,000,000 110,000 120,000 
2,000,000 – 2,500,000 130,000 140,000 
2,500,001 - 150,000 160,000 
 
Table A.2: Compensation Plan – Maintenance Points 








< 90% 0 97.91% - 99.49% 0.9 
90.1% - 91.7% 0.5 99.5% - 100% 1 
91.71% - 93.25% 0.6 100.1% - 100.5% 1.05 
93.26% - 95.85% 0.65 100.51% - 101% 1.08 
95.86% - 96.37% 0.7 101.1% - 101.5% 1.1 
96.38% - 96.89% 0.75 101.51% - 102.5% 1.15 
96.9% - 97.4% 0.8 102.6% - 103% 1.2 








                                                  





Figure 1. The number of transfers 
 
Figure 2. Profit under High vs. Low Retention Pressure 
 
 
 
